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Previously, the State controlled the
allocation of materials, funds and personnel in all
state-owned enterprises, i.e., eating out of the
common rice pot. Due to the special policy,
flexible measures of 1979 and the eating at
seperate kitchens of 1980, some administrative and
financial powers were decentralized to Guangdong
province. Hence, local initiatives in local
economic development have been greatly aroused and
a variety of reforms concerning the relationship
between the State and' the enterprise have been
implemented, namely the Enterprise Fund'-System, the
Profit-retention System, the Tax-for-profit Schemes
and the Contractual Responsibility System.
The Guangdong economy has been growing fast
but the state-owned enterprises are still far from
efficient independent economic units and they are
still within a bureaucratic web. The local
government has continued to intervene into the
daily management of enterprises through industrial
reorganization and other administrative measures.
There was no fundamental change in the
relationship between t e Stake andthe enterprises
as to date. Horizontal-linkage was devised to
overcome territoriality and Contract Responsibility
was devised to bypass the seperation of ownership
and management rights, but the core probietr of
a d nis time intervention into enterprise
management ,ted.
More fundamental changes, like the possibility
of enterprise liquidation or the issuing of shares
by small state-owned enterprises, have to be
implemented if persisting structural problems in
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Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party
Congress of Dec., 1978, the PRC has walked with
cat-like thread for almost a decade now. The
adoption of a Socialist market economy since 1979
had brought about increased productivity in
agriculture and facilitated the flow of labour from
the farming sector into labour-intensive light
industries. Nevertheless, the modernisation of the
enormous state industrial sector during the same
period did not have much success. Despite a broad
range of reforms instituted to invigorate the state
sector, ailing state-owned enterprises continued to
drain the state revenue and the 'iron rice bowl'
was still largely intact.
In GuangUony province, due to the 'special
policy, flexible measures' of 1979, the local
government seemed to be given a free hand in
organizing pilot programmes at the city and county
levels. The urban reform started early in
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Guangdong with the institutional reform of 1983,
i.e., eighteen months ahead of the 1984 Decision.
Party general secretary Zhao Ziyang's call for
Guangdong to go for more daring changes and serve
as the locomotive of reform at the end of 1987 only
fueled the expectations of the success of
the so called 'Guangdong experience'.
This paper reviews reform within the
industrial sector in Guangdong Province. It focus
on the relationship between the state and the
enterprises. The study is divided into two parts:
1979-198 2 false starts and 1983-1986 second wind.
My thesis is that the prosperity of Guangdong in
the peroid was not a result of economic
decentralization to the enterprise level but the
salience of the administrative method and the
initiative ofjthe Guangdong government The local
government empowered by some administrative and
financial decentralization, assumed the leadership
and used administrative orders to manage
enterprises under its jurisdiction without giving
management powers to enterprises.
The financial reform of 1980 led to the
emergence of an ever more powerful provincial
economic administration but it was accompanied by
very limited autonomy to enterprises, i.e., the
re forms did not fundamentally alter the
relationship between local government and their
subordinate enterprises. Administrative methods
•0 industrial reorganization and rectification
were employed to boost industrial
performance. Granting enterprises some autonomy
in production and setting prices led to double-
digit growth in industry alongside serious
stockpiling, reduced productivity and heavy
losses. Excessive investment has been
recognised as one primary reason for continued high
demand, but no effective way to curb it has yet
been found.
The tax-for-profit system, 1983 was an
attempt to reduce the extent to which enterprises
were subject to a kind of local government
ownership, and created the conditions for greater
enterprise autonomy. Nevertheless, the continued
need for administrative controls stands as a major
obstacle to' continued progress in reforms and
device like the 'contracting-out' economic
responsibility system was introduced to
bypass the separation of ownership from
management. Contradictions and undesirable side-
effects resulted from the introduction of some
market forces since 1978 only accentuated the
problem. Economic competition among units has
increased, but competition is still waged with the
technigues of bureaucratic warfare rather than
market competition.
The Guangdong experience illustrated that. 1)
there was only limited reform, 2) there is a
between what was intended and what was actv
implemented concerning reform in the industrial
sector and it highlighted problems of
implementation and formulating policies through the
bureaucracy. Symptoms of over-administnration had
not diminished with reforms instituted to date and
it remains to be seen to what extent the reformists
are able to come up with more effective cure
dealing with persisting structural problems or they
have to be satisfied with short-term remedies that
would only sooth an ever worsening pain.
Meanwhile, unless more systematic changes were
introduced to make state enterprises respond to
price changes rationally, they could not become
efficient economic units. A clearer and stricter
accountability system and a decisive breach from
the current paternalistic welfare-state mentality
are clearly needed if reform is to advance further.
The highly publisized contract responsibility
system since mid-1987 and the long-dued Enterprise
Law of March, 1988 may be seen as action in the
direction.{(
1. Reform
At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party
Congress of December, 1978, it was recognised that
the serious shortcomings in the structure of
economic administration is the over-concentration
1
of authority. The highly-centralized compulsory
planning economic system based on the Soviet model
was characterized by- state monopoly in the
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allocation of funds, materials and manpower.
On the Second Session of the Fifth NPC of June,
1979, reform was expounded as the introduction of a
new economic administrative structure, giving the
locality, bureau and enterprise independent
operational authority under the guidance of unified
state planning. The new economic administrative
structure allows some local authority on planning,
capital construction, financial, materials and
foreign trade areas. It also allows the increase of
enterprise autonomy and the implementation of the
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principle of to each according to his ability.
Previously, the state's policy of high
accumulation and low consumption had been
enormously successful in generating extensive
growth in industry by adding to the stock of
labour capital and other productive factors. For
example, the number of enterprises and industries
increased from about 195 thousand in 1970 to about
377 thousand in 1980. However, the same system
stripped the basic-units of power to improve the
production process, and eroded the incentive for
them to do so. Consequently, the national economy
faced reducing productivity and lacked vitality.
In order to modernise the industrial sector, an
intensive growth strategy has to be adopted by
raising the productivity of the existing stock of
productive factors, i.e., to increase efficiency
through qualitative factors like technological
change, organizational improvements and better
product quality. Hence, the new economic
administrative structure entails the delegation of
authority to lower levels in order to improve the
management and effeciency of lower level
administrative and economic units.
The most fundamental problems in the system
could be summarized as those underlying:
A. the relationship between the centre
and localities, and
B. the relationship between the state
and the enterprises.
Reform includes:
i) administrative decentralization, and
ii) financial decentralization.
A.i) Special policy, flexible measures, 1979
In order to implement the reform, the center
resolved to adopt special policy, flexible
-measures in Guangdong in 1979. To implement the
principle of reform entails more autonomy to the
provincial government, the reform of the economic
administrative structure, measures to enliven
domestic economy by loosening up the strictures
that hamstring the economy and ultilising the
special conditions of the province in opening up to
the outside world by increasing foreign trade and
technology exchange and establishing Special
Economic Zones.
To the Guangdong government, decentralization of
administrative powers to the provincial level in
order to revitalize the economy meant province-
centered planning in order to allow flexibility in
ultilising strengths of the local economy in terms
of the use of foreign capital and technology for
building socialism as well as the initiation of
reforms in the economic arena by the provincial
government.
A.ii) Eating at seperate kitchens' 1980
In the financial arena, decentralization
measures were made known on Feburary, 1980. The
centre is no longer the sole agent in planning and
balancing the budget for the whole country. The
scope of revenues and expenditures will be defined
for central and local governments respectively and
whereby each will be responsible for the balance of
its own budget. Likewise, a province, muncipality
or autonomous region may adopt the same system to
counties and cities under its administration.
In 1980, the centre adopted the balanced
budget, revenue-sharing, ratio-contract and three-
year peroid method over Guangdong. In turn, the
Guangdong government in the same year adopted the
fixed revenues and expenditures, balanced budget,
profit-sharing, balance retention and two-year
peroid method toward counties and cities under its
jurisdiction. The method was changed to the scope
of revenues and expenditures will be defined for
province and city or county respectively and
whereby each will be responsible for balancing its
own budget in 1981 by which the scope of revenues
and expenditures at each level is determined, the
baseline of the contract and the ratio for
calculation or the quota of subsidies
are fixed for a peroid of five years.
B.i) Enterprise Autonomy Policy, 1979
Administrative decentralization to the
locality was to be accompanied by parallel
delegation of authority to the enterprises. The
enterprise was to be given the necessary autonomy
to organise production and sales so that the law of
value can be observed in a socialist market
economy.
The enterprise autonomy programme was formally
on the agenda in July, 1979, at the National
Conference on the Increase of Production and Saving
in Industry and Transport in Chengdu when the five
documents with reference to the areas of
enterprise autonomy, the depriciation funds of
fixed assets, the taxation of fixed assets, the
profit retention system and the supply of working
capital through bank loans were
discussed.
It was reported that in 1979, there were 100
enterprises involved in the pilot programme in
increasing enterprise autonomy and by 1983, over
90% of state-owned enterprise above the county-
level have adopted some form of economic
responsibility system which was mainly in the form
of responsibility for profits and losses. Indeed,
the focal point of enterprise autonomy in Guangdong
from 1979 to 1983 was the Profit Rentention Schemes
and the decentralization of authority in other
functional areas did not receive much attention
until the attempts to decentralize authority in ten
functional areas in 1984.
Probably because of a lack of coordination,
the State Economic Commission initiated a reform-
oriented policy of enterprise autonomy and at the
same time this policy was implemented at a rapid
and almost uncontrolled pace from 1979 to 1980. A
reform-oriented enterprise autonomy policy would
have delegated many managerial powers to the
enterprise level from plans for supplementary
production, the supply of materials, personnel
management, product design, exports and foreign
currency, and marketing and distribution, to
financial management.In each of these areas,
however, the enterprise was given a very limited
amount of power. Moreover, the enterprise
autonomy policy went through a process of
reformulation in the second half of 1981. It became
known as the 'industrial production, economic
responsibility system'. The term 'responsibility'
implies that the relationship between the state,
enterprises, and individual producers should be
hierarchical rather than economic in nature.
B.ii) Profit Retention Scheme, 1979
The State Council in Nov., 1978 had already
introduced temporary measures like the Enterprise
Fund Scheme to provided additional incentives to
workers. Guangdong province did not begin to
implement the profit-retention system until
late August, 1979, one and a-half months after
the State Council had promulgated its profit-
retention regulations in the five documents of
July 1979. At the Provincial Conference on the
Increase of Production and Saving in Industry and
Transport, August, 1979, Guangdong announced the
profit-retention methods would be given a try in
100 enterprise units and another 300 enterprises
would have a smaller scope of reform enabling the
enterprise fund, the welfare fund and the bonus
fund to be derived from the profit of enterprise
rather than from the total of wage bill. It was
estimated that the 100 provincial and city-
administrated enterprises produced approximately
60% of the profit created by state-owned
enterprises in the province. The number of this
group of enterprises increased to 169 in 1981. In
1980, the State Council ordered the pilot programme
basing on fixed comparison method to be changed
to the more cumbersome circular comparison method
but the province did not followed. The provincial
authorities permitted the supervising bureaus to
make adjustments to production targets and levels
of retained profits for the most efficient
enterprises,in order to minimize disincentive to
them.
Tax-for-profit
Meanwhil-e, in response to central initiative,
Guangdong introduced the programme of independent
accounting, taxation to the state and
responsibility for profits and losses to eight
state-owned enterprises at the end of 1980. As a
result, these enterprises reported 40% increases in
industrial output value and commerial and
industrial tax value and the enterprise total
accumulation amount increased by over 70%
yithin two years. The scheme enabled the
participating units to retain all profit after the
payment of income tax, the commercial and
industrial tax, and the fees for use of fixed
assets and working capital.The participating
enterprises were then free to use their profit in
accordance with a broad guideline: 60% for
rennovation and expansion, 20% for welfare
facilities and 20% for bonus. The scale of the
experiment remained unchanged until April, 1983
when the State Council called for an expansion of
the said scheme to all state-owned enterprises.
Qingyuan Model, 1978
At the county-level, which was not subject to
the authority of the center, the Qingyuan model was
carried out in state-owged enterprises. It was
essentially an extra-state-planned profit-retention
scheme started at the end of 1978 at Qingyuan
County. After fulfilling production quota allocated
by the state, the enterprises were allowed to plan
further production and profits derived was shared
with the state under the differential-sum method of
profit-retention. As early as April, 1979, all the
industrial offices were abolished and the County
Economic Committee centralized all the manageing
and planning powers over the enterprise units. In
Nov., 1979, there were 507 state-owned enterprises
at the county-level,which was approximately one
third of state-owned enterprises in the province,
practising the Qingyuan model. By Mar.,1981, 73
out of 82 counties, or 989 out of about 1,300
state owned enterprises adopted the scheme and it
was soon spreaded to twelfth other provinces. The
Qingyuan county-level industrial administrative
structure was also posted as example for others.
In 1983, 78 counties in the province adopted the
scheme and half of the counties of the province
copied the Qingyuan industrial administrative
structure by centralizing the managing and planning
powers in their county economic committee.
Because of the extra-state-planned profit-
retention scheme, insufficient state-planned
production and supply of raw materials induced the
county-level state-owned enterprises to acquire raw
materials through the market to increase production
and to improve the quality of commodities for sale.
Approximately 40% of the output value of
enterprises at the county-level was through market-
coordination. This contributed to the relatively
prosperous market in Guangdong and in 1982, extra-
state—planned materials and commodities going in
and out of the province were over 10 million yuan
respectively.
To summarize, financial decentralization from
the centre to the localities and the profit
retention between the state and the enterprises led
to the maximization of revenue or the maximization
of profit behavior and the initiatives at various
levels were greatly aroused. We will discuss some
of the problems related to these behavior, namely
territoriality in chapter 3. In the next chapter,
we will review the behavior of the Guangdong
government in areas other than that of maximizing
revenue during the first part of our study.
2. Adj ustment
Guangdong in the post-Mao era had been
following the pragmatic policy tendency of Deng
Xiaoping in enterprise management which was marked
by the restoration of the administrative approach
to policy-making rather than through class
struggle. Adjustment was, thus, a continuation to
the trend of the restoration of central planning
and the building up of the state bureaucracy in the
province.
Despite some financial reform, industrial
administration in Guangdong continued to rely
heavily on the administrative method. At the Second
Session of the Fifth NPC,Jun., 1979, the policy
platform of adjustment, reform, rectification and
improvement11 was adopted. Previously, at the Central
Work Conference of the CCP, Apr., 1979, the
platform was introduced and adjustment was
determined to be the policy priority for the next
three years, i.e., from 1979 to 1981. In 1981, the
State Council decided to continue the policy
platform of 1979 for another five years for
adjustment was unexpectably complicated involving
redressing economic imbalances between industry and
agriculture, the heavy industrial sector and the
light industrial sector, the accumulation ratio and
the consumption ratio and the rationalization of
the economic structure.
In 1979, the adjustment policy aimed at
improving living standards by increasing the share
of consumption in national income giving priority
first to agriculture, then light industry, and
lastly heavy industry and it included seeking
greater benefits from foreign trade.
Four methods were adopted for adjustment in
the industrial sector by the Guangdong government
in 1979: (1) to decrease the proportion of
heavy indusrtry while increasing the proportion
of light industry in the province, (2)
to protect efficient firms and to remove
inefficient ones, (3) to encourage industries
capable of generating quicker return in investment,
and (4) to slow down capital construction.
Adjustment was to be combined with rectification
and the 'increase of production and saving
movement'.
In fact, Guangzhou Municipality, under the
Mayorship of Yang Shenkun, formulated policy to
support the light industry as early as Jul., 1979.
The Provincial Economic Commission issued a
circular by the end of Jul., 1979, calling for
special measures to increase production of the
light and textile industries as well as the
improvement of fuel industry and transportation
system.
In Dec., 1979, Yang Zheng, Director of the
Provincial Planning Commission stated that the
light and textile industries would be given
priority in six areas: supply of raw material, fuel
and electricity, the funding for technical
rennovation, capital investment, bank loan,
foreign exchange and importation of technology plus
5
transportation facilities. In 1981, the same
priorities were given to all light industries in
the province and some heavy industries and chemical
industries were asked to switch to produce
6
consumer-oriented commodities.
Adjustment was also operationalized through
industrial reorganization. It entails a heavy
dosage of direct administrative intervention
through readjusting the jurisdictions over
enterprise units in order to alter the direction of
capital investment under a growth intensive
strategy. These are administrative, top-down
processes, not the product of independent decisions
by enterprises themselves.
i) Increase of Production and Saving Movement,
1979
The basic strategy of industrial
reorganization as popularized by the movement was
not adopted by the Guangdong leadership and the
economic bureaucracy until the Work Conference on
the Increase of Production and Saving in the
Industry and Transport Sector on Aug., 1979. All
available fuel, energy and material was to be
devoted to supporting those efficient lines and
enterprises which were profitable, consumed less
material, produced high quality and marketable
commodities. It was reported that 269 enterprise
units were either closed down, transferred, merged
or stopped in 1979.
The strategy was recovery-oriented, and
concentrated on regrouping enterprises and
readjusting their economic relationships, by means
of programmes of 'closure, stoppage, merger and
transfer' which were applied to less efficient
enterprises and the reallocation of resources to
consumer-oriented industries. In 1981, it was
reported that 619 state-owned enterprise was
covered by 'closure, stoppage, merger and transfer'
in 1979 and 1980 with over half of which beinc
transfers. The trend of reallocation of resources
to consumer-oriented industries continued in 1982.
Because of the re—adjustment in the commodity
structure, fuel consumption in every 10 thousand
output value decreased 8.9% and 3.4% in 1981 and
1982 respectively.
ii) Forming Joint Economic Entities
Part of the recovery-oriented version of
industrial reorganization was the forming of joint
economic entities. Industrial reorganization of the
type tended to reinforce the administrative policy¬
making approach which was rooted in central
planning. It entails decentralization from central
ministries and local bureaux to corporations and
conglomerates, and centralization from factories to
corporations. It was relatively effective in
improving rationality, efficiency, and control over
industrial production, management, and
distribution. In theoretical terms, it may be
taken as a remedial response to the unintended
conseciusnces of a highly centralized and intendedly
rational system of economic management.
if 0 f o r m— o r i e n t e d version of industrial
reorganization was also introduced in 1S80 which
attempts to forge an economic network oriented
toward markets. it entails the rise of the
economic policy-making approach, and also attempts
to replace bureau-type enterprises with market-
oriented management. It is marked by changes in the
direction of enterprise autonomy, market
mechanisms, and the economic leverage of the state.
However, it was the recovery-oriented version of
'association' which was implemented. In 1981, 129
such jointed economic entities (production
association and specialized companies) were formed
out of 524 participating enterprises. In addition
to having an orientation towards recovery, it was
also guided by the goal of rationalizing
relationships between enterprises. Industrial
reorganization was justified in terms of the
advantages to be derived from the economies of
scale and the technical division of labour among
various units; the development of lateral working
relations among enterprises and decreasing the
direct intervention of government in enterprise
management; eliminating the tendency of each
enterprise unit to be acquisitive and possessive
towards its equipment and facilities at the expense
of their utilization rate and eliminating
'territoriality' of economic activities, which was
created by the administrative boundaries of
ministries and localities and the vested interests
that these administrative divisions fostered.
Despite the curtailment of basic construction
generally, capital investment in light industries
was only 4.1% of the total investment of
the province in 1978 which was considered too low.
Considerable attention was given to the import of
advance technology and facilities and the province
allocated US$ 640thousand for such purpose in 1982.
Enterprises were encouraged to invest like it was
recommended that the enterprise depreciation fund
and production development fund should be used for
technology rennovation. The provincial investment
in technology rennovation amount to about 1 billion
yuan or a 13.4% increase over 1981 in the year
1982.
Economic adjustment and industrial
reorganization appears to be successful in
Guangdong during the first part of the peroid under
our study. The proportion of light industry in the
total industrial production value increased from
57.2% in 1979, 61.8% in 1980, 65.1% in 1981 to
64.6% in 1982. Light industries switched from a
negative growth rate in the first half of 1979 to a
positive 15.6% increase in 1980, 17.4% in 1981 and
9.2-6 in 1982. Meanwhile, heavy industry decreased
by 0.36% in 1980, grew only by 1.8% in 1981 and
increased by 6% in 1982 because of the policy of
encouraging heavy industries to switch to produce
consumer-oriented commodities in 1981.
By 1982, attention was then given to the total
rectification of enterprise in the comiri'g two years
and the perfection of the economic responsibility
system through: (1) the implementation of profit-
sharing and responsibilitiy for profits and losses
scheme, e.g., the collective-owned enterprises of
the Second Light Industry implemented the
responsibility for profits and losses in 1982, (2)
the consolidation of innerenterprise
responsibility system, (3) the rationalization of
the baseline of contract and the calculation of
increase in profit-retention scheme to ensure that
the profit increases in enterprise do not exceed
production increases and (4) implementation of the
21
director responsibility system. The first batch
of 400 enterprise recorded a 10% increase in profit
22
to the state in 1982.
To summarize, the success of the adjustment
measures signified that the economic bureaucracy of
Guangdong was back in the leadership role with a
firm grip on the implementation of industrial
policies. It also illustrated the effectiveness of
central planning or recovery-oriented industrial
reorganization in rationalising macro-economics to
increase efficiency. The administrative method
will be more and more be relied upon as we shall
see in the next chapter when the problem of
territoriality appears. t•
3. Territoriality
Territoriality is the tendency for local
authorities to erect artifical barriers to protect
their own markets and raw material sources, thereby
laying claim to the revenue and profits generated
by the enterprise under their furisdiction. The
enterprise themselves also attempt to maximize
their retained profits while converting retained
ft-
profits and funds into capital investment.
In an attempt to minimize the over-
concentration of authority, territoriality
resulted. The provincial government consided the
golden age of Guangdong had arrived but the
prosperity as seen in the eyes of the local
leadership was not without contradictions and side-
effects from the national economic development
point of view. Indeed, the golden age of
Guangdong was the result of financial reform,
adjustment measures, as well as inner—enterprise
1
rectification. It was, after all, the result of
the leadership of the local government in the
economic development of the province during the
first part of our review.
For the four years peroid from 1979 to 1982,
the total industrial output value of Guangdong
increased by over 7 billion 660 million or
increased 38.1% in 1982 when compared with 1978.
Annual industrial growth rate was at an average of
8.6% for the same peroid.
With the industrial sector contributing
approximately 83% of revenue to the province, the
achievement of the industrial sector was especially
impressive for enabling a balanced provincial
budget against the heavy national budget deficits.
Provincial revenue increased by an average of 7.6%
during the four years. Figures for 1979 and 1980
are not avaliable,but provincial revenue was at
billion 58 million yuan for 1981 and 4 billion 200
million for 1982. Yet,national deficits were at 17
billion 60 million in 1979, 12 billion 750 million
in 1980, 2 billion 550 million in 1981 and 2
billion 930 million in 1982.
Specifically, the state-owned enterprise
achieved a 20.2% increase in profit to the state in
1980. With the light industries contributing about
one third of profit remittance to the state in
1979, the rate dropped 5.2% in 1981 and 3.4% in
1982 although their profits on the whole had been
increasing all the while. Attention to the problem
led to the appraisal of the increase of profit-
retention ratio and the 400 rectified industrial
and transport enterprises contributed a 10%
increase in profit to the state in 1982.
Primarily because of the introduction of the profit
retention scheme, it was reported that the
provincial state-owned industry and transport
enterprises gained over 1 billion in the four
10
years.
From 1979 to 1982 the unintended consequences
of financial decentralization included the over¬
extension of capital investment, the depletion of
the sources of central revenue, and the perceived
danger of excessive expenditure on wage increases,
11
welfare, and housing. With the introduction of
profit retention, the state has allowed enterprises
to keep more of their profits, but it has not found
an effective mechanism to ensure that the money
will go back to long-term production and not be
used for immediate distribution among the workers.
The annual average wages for the workers of the
province was 670 yuan in 1979, 776 yuan in 1980,
12
820 yuan in 1981 and 940 yuan in 1982.
The state was especially ineffective in
controlling investment. Two major and reinforcing
factors were responsible for the uncontrolled
expansion of extra-budgetary capital investment:
the introduction of a revenue-sharing policy
between the central and local levels and the
profit-retention system. In 1982, the province
decided to spend about US$ 60 million from the
province's foreign currency reserve on imported
facilities and localities, and enterprises were
encouraged to invest on technology rennovation.
Since 1980, fixed asset ivestment Into light and
textile industries, energy and transport through
bank loans alone amounted to over 1 billion 100
million by 1982. Fixed capital investment
increased 22.8% and extra-bugetary investment
increased 74.7% in 1981 alone.
Together with the problem of excessive increase
in fixed capital investment, some light and textile
commodities were already found to be stockpiling.
Production costs increased 1.2% in 1981 and 1.4% in
1982. Enterprise losses were at 32.7% in 1981 and
28.6% in 1982.
During 1980, the State Council, together with
local units, were able to complete an assessment of
working capital and to fix norms for
each state-owned enterprise. On the basis of
these, the State Council started to increase
financial responsibility for the amount of working
capital in the enterprise's possession, either
through the collection of fees or the charging of
bank loans. Increases in working capital from 1979
to 1983 were mainly supplied by bank loans(about 82
%), and a smaller proportaion was appropriated by
the financial departments(18%). in the three years
from 1980 to 1982, the use of working capital by
the province was increasing and was considered
inefficient.
Municipal and provincial governments,
permitted to keep a large portion of local revenue,
have not used the increased income to invest in
long-term, low-yield public projects as was
expected of them. Basic construction amount to 11
billion 500 million in the four years peroid with
over 15 thousand large and small projects
completed. Inefficiencies in the basic
construction and exchange fields were rampant.
Premier Zhao Ziyang at the National Conference
of Industry and Transport Sector, March, 1982,
summarized the situation after the introduction of
decentralization measures. Eating at seperate
kitchens has obviously tapped local initiative in
economic development. Nevertheless, the whole
country as a single chessboard principle was
violated because of territoriality, localism and
liberal tendency.
The effects of territoriality are the lack of
lateral coordination, mutual hostility among
localities, struggles between local units for
resources and markets, and endeavours to control
industrial enterprises and thus to control revenues
and investment funds. The result is increasing
profit reported by enterprises but decreasing
22
remittance to the state.
In a peroid of province-centred planning,
some regions were authorized to get rich first,
but one province one market situations were
against the objective of the establishment of a
23
unified socialist market. A cellular pattern of
development with local government developing their
own industrial and commercial complexes at the
expense of economic efficiency could only harm the
24
state. Like in the foreign trade area, vicious
competition among locality, department and
enterprises brought some benefits to the local
level and the enterprises but resulted in less
bargaining power to all contestants concerned and2 5
resulted in enormous losses to the state.
It is worthwhile to note the practice of
centralization of controls alongside the
decentralisation of management. This is in
essence a version of centralization. The system as
envisaged by Chen Yun and Hsueh Munchiao in 1956-57
consists of a combination of centralization,
decentralization I and decentralization II.
Independent operational authority gives greater
flexibility to enterprise while profit is made a
major success criterion in industry. That is to
say that the centralization impulse or the occasion
for string-pulling from the centre was always
there. Moreover, controls may also be from the
provincial government. The system has always been
highly centralised from the viewpoint of the
enterprises.
Facing the problem of stockpiling or the sheer
increase in output value disregarding economic
inefficiencies, the State Council did not
hestitated to issue administrative directives to
correct the situation. This is consistant with the
post— Weberian framework which suggests that any
attempt at rationalization is inheirently inadequate
and that it is difficult, if not entirely
impossible, to eliminate the residual area of
irrationality, so that a further cycle of
rationalization must occur. In an open system, the
faiibi1ity of policy makers and bounded
rationality of policy-making process, together
with the territoriality of China's industrial
management resulted in the occurance of repeated
cycles of administrative control.
Thus, over investment was to be checked through
the three ratios declared in 1983: the capital
income ratio, the working capital turnover ratio
and the fixed capital investment remittance ratio.
The state has made it clear that local initiative
and province-based planning could only exist under
unified state planning by intensifying the existing
chain of administrative command.
Furthermore, by 1983, there was a slight shift
of emphasis to technical rennovation, developing
existing enterprises in order to lower production
cost and exchange fees in the adjustment programme
and financial discipline was tightened amid efforts
to eliminate red-ink enterprises through a series
of administrative orders. Renovation was considered
more effective than capital investment in producing
tangible economic results, at least in the short
term. An increase in funding for renovation
projects was advocated in order to enhance
'intensity'.
A simple increase in funding for renovation
could not, however, solve the problem of the
inefficient use of fixed assets. The State
Council, had issued a policy paper on June, 1980,
calling for increased funding for technical
renovation, and also placing emphases upon: (a)
energy-conserving projects, (b) the light, textile,
and handicraft indusrtries, (c) the transportation
system, and (d) projects for improving product
quality and product mix, and for increasing
consumer goods and export commodities.
The provincial leadership added to the list of
administrative directives by stipulating a 2.5%
decrease in fuel consumption, a 2% decrease in
production costs of state-owned industries and
enterprises and 2.5% increase in workers'
productivity to be achieved in 1983.
The problem of the over-extension and
redundancy of capital investments finally led to
the introduction of the 'contracting-out' system of
economic responsibility in mar., 1983.
It is now obvious that the questionable
industrial performance of Guangdong during the 1979
to 1982 peroid could be attributed to the salience
of the administrative method or adjustment measures
implemented by the local government. The viability
released by the Financial Reform prompted the
Guangdong government as well as the enterprises to
maximize renvenue or profit though it may not
necessarily be beneficial to the state.
In short, decentralization of autonomy to
-locality created closed economic complexes,
localism and territoriality while decentralization
of autonomy to enterprise created problems of
control and supervision. State directives spelling
out what various units are supposed to do with
their newly obtained power and resources have
fallen on dearf ears because there is little
penalty for defying orders. Indeed, when an
enterprise cannot go bankrupt or is not subject to
financial discipline, it will respond to rising
costs by raising sale prices and staff wages, and
not by reducing staff or making better use of
resources. The state would always be there to bail
out inefficient firms.
Furthermore, the local government was not
enthusiastic in initiating measures to free
enterprises from the web of bureaucratic central
planning or to introduce genuine reform of the
authority-oriented system. It was satisfied with
the increasing revenue generated and the increase
of expenditure on administration fees over the last
few years pointed to wastefulness or more red tape
but most likely, the result of both tendencies.
To summarize, one cycle of administrative
control was completed from 1979 to 1982. Over-
concentration of authority led to decentralization
and resulted in territoriality which intensified
the administrative chain. In chapter 4, we will
consider the remedy of contrastual responsibility
introduced to fine tune control of enterprise
performance by the state. The enterprises would
still be firmly placed within the state ownership
framework and the tremendous workload in the
determination of baseline and the rato for the
calculation of profits, etc., in order to establish
contracts on specific basis have reserved an
important role for the economic bureaucracy.
4. Urban Reform
There were two attempts at further reform
in the second part of our review: the urban reform,
1983 onwards and the comprehensive urban economic
reform, 1984 onward. The first attempt was a
reform-oriented phase of industrial reorganization
and the second attempt was the second wind of the
development of a more economic-co-ordinated system
which had a false start in the enterprise autonomy
policy and the promotion of economic combinations
between 1979 and the end of 1980. Both attempts
were aimed at solving the problem of the deficiency
of the administrative method although the first
attempt was largely remedial and within the
authority-co-ordinated system while the second
attempt was aiming at a breakthrough.
Urban Reform, 1983 onward
In the midst of re-centralization measures, the
Guangdong leadership continued the initiative in
provincial planning as the provincial party
Committee spelled out the need for practical
considerations and flexibility in the
implementation of policies at the Fifth Provincial
Party Congress of Feburary, 1983. Basing on the
guideline provided by the Fifth Session of the
Fifth NPC, November, 1982, the Guangdong leadership
devised the slogan of contract, association and
circulation for the industry and transport front
in 1983. This was the beginning of a reform-
oriented phase of industrial reorganization with
emphasis on economic networks centering around
cities which later evolved into the 'comprehensive
urban economic reform' of 1984.
Reform-oriented industrial reorganization is
essentially an attempt to forge an economic network
oriented toward markets. It is also an attempt to
replace bureau-type enterprises with market-
oriented management. Thus, it entails the rise of
the economic policy-making approach and with the
government not directly manageing enterprises,
economic combinations were design to overcome the
lack of lateral co-ordination, mutual blockage due
to territoriality and departmentalism at the
expense of macro-rationality. ~Indicative of the
development towards a reform-oriented phase of
industrial reorganization was the change to an
emphasis on enterprise autonomy, market mechanisms,
and the economic leverage of the state.
By that time, the State Council had already
decided to order the implementation of the tax-
for profit scheme in all state-owned
enterprises at the Fifth Session of the Fifth NPC
November, 1982. Also, the leadership was convinced
that urban reform has to be accompanied by the
administrative structure reform. In addition, Zhao
Ziyang first mentioned the function of the cities
in the overall economic reform plan at Szechuan at
early 1982 and the same idea was reinterated by Bo
Yibo at early 1983. That is to say that the top
leadership had finally begun to address the problem
of the deficiency of the administrative method
instead of dealing only with the problem of over-
concentration of authority. This shift of emphasis
in the new direction was incorporated in the
principle of 'the sepera tion of g-we-mment and
enterprise function' which was to be the objectives
of the administrative structure reform.
A. contract
In a very loose sense, contract meant that
enterprises are to establish various forms of the
economic responsibility system with contracted jobs
as the main content on the basis of an agreement
with their counterpart units. The basic principles
of this responsibility system were stated as a
combination of responsibility, authority and
benefit; the unity of the interests of the state,
the collectives and the individuals, and the
linking of the income of workers and staff members
with their job performance.
The word 'responsibility7 gave the policy a
hierarchical meaning. The enterprises were to be
given some powers in planning their production and
sales but the emphasis was clearly on the economic
responsibility of enterprises in terms of their
duties to generate profit and tax to the state.
According to a contract to generate certain amount
of profit and tax to the state, above quota profits
are shared between the enterprise and its
counterpart in fixed proportions. There was
already the regulations to stop profit-sharing
according to an accumulation ratio in December,
1981.
Technology rennovation and advancement was
increasingly considered important for increasing
economic returns. Hence, all enterprises were
required to devise a plan of technology rennovation
and devsl opment of _nj5-W productj5__ in 19 8 3,
administrative orders were used to eliminate the
use of backward technology, and the production of
inferior products and measures were taken to
encourage the development of new products, and the
use of advance technology through pricing, fees and
9
profit-retention ratio preferences.
Bearing in mind that the State Council had
resolved to implement the first stage of the tax-
for-profit scheme in all state-owned
enterprises in 1983, instead of attempts to
increase enterprise autonomy in other functional
areas, the policy of economic responsibility in the
form of contract to ensure the proportion of funds
available for technology rennovation and
development or to increase economic returns could
only be seen as a means to enable enterprises to
better comply with the guidance of compulsory
planning. Contract plus the dispatchment of
efficiency indexes as well as production and sales
quotas were administrative means to organize
10
enterprises.
The policy has its origin in 1981 and 1982 when
the State Council was preoccupied with the problem
of the over-extension and redundancy of capital
investments. The 'contracting—out system of
economic responsibility was first introduced in
construction units in March, 1983, with the aim of
overcoming the disincentives for construction units
and enterprises to shorten construction peroids,
improve quality, reduce construction costs, and
increase economic returns.
Guangdong was reported to be successful with
reforming the allocation system when the State
Economic Structural Reform Committee summarized
five years of pilot programmes in urban reform at
Changzhou in April, 1984. Guangdong practiced the
contract responsibility system which could have
included responsibilities in attaining stipulated
standards in technology-level, investment direction
and scale, economic returns, the amount of
inter-enterprise co-ordination, quantity, quality,
cost of products, the completion of deadlines, etc.
Specific contract arrangement differs from
enterprise to enterprise but the secretary of the
Guangzhou Party Committee summarized the principles
of contractual responsibility as fixing the
baseline, ensuring the level of remittance,
increasing retention level with increasing revenue
and the responsibility for decreasing revenue by
enterprises, i.e., 'contracting-out' of profit
remittance, and the 'contracting-out' of wages in
production cost. Once the contract is established
between the enterprise and the city government over
a peroid of time, a better accountability system is
established with the enterprises given more powers
than previously under the centralized management
system.
The defect of the 'contracting-out'system was
in the fixing of the baseline and there was the
tendency to retain profit at the expense of the
remittance to the state. Guangdong implemented the
system in all state-owned enterprises in 1986 and
the increase of profit and tax remittance to the15
state dropped sharply to only a 0.4% in 1986.
B. Association
Association or the formation of economic
combination is essentially attempts to replace
bureau-type enterprise with market-oriented
management. Interenterprise co-ordination, which
was part of the recovery-oriented industriaal
reorganization programme stared in 1979 when joint
economic entities and specialized companies were
organized, was now upgraded in 1983 with the
introduction of economic combinations and
conglomerates, economic entities independent from
the state organization as attempts to
decentra1i1zed planned economies and to foster
horizontal integration of economies of large—scale
production on regional basis transcending urban and
rural areas, administrative boundaries, etc. The
development was in the direction of an enterprise-
centered and market-oriented economy with economic
16
networks centering around cities.
Economic combination has its origin in the
reform-oriented phase of industrial reorganization
beginning in the mid-1980 when the State Council
promulgated the 'Provisional Regulation of
17
Promoting Economic Combinations' in July, 1980.
The policy paper attempted to scale down state
intervention and to make full use of the potential
economic ties between enterprises. It was later
supplemented by another policy paper promulgated by
the State Council, 'Provisional Regulation of
Developing and Promoting Socialist Competition' in
• 18
October, 1980. In this policy paper, the state was
recommended to assume a regulatory role, using
economic leverage and employing indicative planning
while competition among enterprise was expanded
through markets for commodities and material
19
supply.
The Guangdong government resolved not to
directly manage industries and enterprises except
for key enterprises in 1983. These industries and
enterprises were then placed under the unified
administration of the concerned cities. At the
county level, the city-centered development
strategy was first tried out at Foshan and Shaokuan
areas in 1983. Planning powers were decentralized
to these cities accordingly. For example, the city
government can adjust prices within certain limits.
With the acceleration of the development of
association emphasizing horizontal linkage,
comprehensive urban economic reform pilot
programmes were started at the municipality and
three medium-sized cities, namely Guangzhou,
Chanchiang, Foshan and Chiangmen in 1984.
Circulation involves a new relationship of
production, exchange and consumption and it also
involves the re-alignment of the relationships
among the various departments. A relatively
market-coodinated system was first implemented in
Guangdong in 1980 with the 'Twelfth Measures' to
invigorate the sale of commodities; inadequate
material supply was dealed with by arranging joint
economic entities, trade with other provinces and
import from abroad. The provincial leadership took
note of the demand of Chen Yun at the time and
upheld the principle of 'the predominance of a
planned economy supplemented by market-co¬
ordination'. The Guangdong government stated that
a prosperous but not chaotic economy is compatible
with the relatively market-co-ordinated situation
in the province.
Concerning the administrative structural reform,
the Guangdong government started the institutionaal
reform as the first step toward the reform on the
administrative structure in 1983. The
institutional reform was accompanied by a partial
-and piecemeal cadre personnel reform. As the
speed of the reform was accelerated, the seperation
of state and enterprise function principle led to
the emergence of a new economic administrative
structure at the comprehensive urban economic
reform pilot programme in the 4 cities.
To summarize, in 1984, the urban reform was
overlapped with the development of the
comprehensive urban economic reform mainly in
response to the direction and principles of future
reform as given by Zhao Ziyang during the Second
Session of the Sixth NPC, May, 1984. We will
proceed with the new version of urban reform in
chapter 5 before we try to-compare the two attempts
at further reform during the second part of our
review.
5. Comprehensive Urban Economic Reform
A. Enterprise Autonomy Policy
The more economic-oriented system of enterprise
autonomy, which was enabled by the tax—for—prof it
scheme received more attention when the state
pushed for comprehensive urban economic reform in
1984. When the State Economic Structural Reform
Committee summoned the discussion on Urban Reform
pilot programme at Changzhou in April, 1984, it
proposed that all state-owned enterprises in the
pilot cities should have the power to plan its
production, supply and marketing; keep and budget
funds it is entitled to retain; appiont, remove,
employ or elect its own personnel according to
relevant regulations; decide on how to recruit and
use its work force, and on wages and
rewards; set the prices of its products within the
limits prescribed by the state and to adopt
flexible and diversified forms of operation.
The State Council promulgated the' Provisional
measures concerning further enterprise autonomy in
the state-owned industries and enterprises' in May,
1984 specifying enterprise autonomy in ten
functional areas. Guangdong reinterated the need to
give enterprises powers in ten functional areas at
the provincial conference on urban reform pilot
2
programme in June, 1984. Starting June, 1984, 70
enterprises in Guangzhou started the enterprise
3
autonomy pilot programme. It was then that the
province recognised the need to catch up with Zhao
Ziyang's version of a faster programme of reform
as declared at the Second Session of the Sixth NPC,
May 1984,which was more aggressive than that on the
4
provincial reform agenda. The agenda of the Second
Session of the Sixth PPC, June, 1984, fully
endorsed the new version of reform with the
introduction of the tax system for all state-owned
enterprises involved.
In August, 1984, the Guangdong government
encouraged enterprise autonomy by 'Ten Measures':
(1) different tax rate and different contract
system for different types of enterprises,
(2) enterprises nationalized after 1979 can be
reverted backed to collective-owned enterprises and
implement 'independent accounting, responsibility
for profits and losses',
(3) try out the issuing of shares or the return of
principle and interests with the consent of the
workers, department and the locality concerned,
(4) facilities concerning materials supply and
planning,
(5) the adjustment of depriciation funds,
0.5-6 to 1-6 of the sales revenune for
technology development fund,
(7) election or contract employment system for
leading cadres,
(8) contract employment for workers,
(9) wage reform basing on the experience of
Shenzhen and Shekou,
(10) small state-owned enterprises at the county-
level can implement the 'state-ownership,
self management, tax or contracting-out according
to legislation, responsibility for profits and
5
losses' system.
In Oct., 1984, the second stage of tax-for-
profit was implemented in all state-owned
enterprises. The importance of giving powers to
enterprise was stated clearly in the October
Resolution at the Third Plenum of the Tewlfth
6
Party Congress.
As the emphasis of the state shifted to the
1 v i g o r a t i o n of the large and medium —sized
enterprise since March, 1985, which was marked by
the National Forum on Urban Economic Structural
Reform at Wuhan,. there were further directives
concerning problems in invigorating the large and
medium-sized enterprises by the State Council in
September, 1985. The province finally established
the Economic Structural Reform Commission of
Guangdong province in April, 1986, with Governor Ye
as the head.
B. Horizontal Linkage
The hiving-off of the state or the changing role
of the city government toward regulating the
economy became the core ideas of the comprehensive
urban economic reform of 1984. Changzhou
municipality was one of the earliest examples of a
small city where industrial reorganization was
carried out with marked success. The movement away
from administrative corporations to enterprise
types of corporations started as early as 1982.
In June, 1984, the Guangdong government
decentralized powers in 'Six Areas' to corporations
and lower levels.
The Provincial Economic Work Conference of
April, 1985 also emphasised the need of the
transformation of economic bureaus into service
oriented, advise—giving organizations. During the
fljst urban economic reform conference of 1985,
there were worries that enterprises may suffer the
loss of benefits because of association with otfu
enterprises and administrative practises ha
prevented direct communication between enterprises.
Hence, the local government proposed to become the
match-maker to interested enterprises. In
addition, the Finance Bureau of Guangzhou adopted
measures to decrease or to eliminate income taxes
and offered adjustment tax preferences to encourage
the development of horizontal-linkage.
As a result, Guangdong developed its three-level
regional horizontal linkages:
1) a cluster of key technology project developed
across provinces,
2) the development of regulated relations among
neighbouring provinces, and
3) the establishment of key exchange and
technology projects between city and county, bureau
and industries within the province.
(rAssociationirs,ince 1984 has been considered a
means to open up the market for the diffusion of
more advanced technology at the coast to the less
developed interior. In addition, in 1985, the
municipality started 110 key technology projects
with an output value of up to 5.03 billion with the
eight counties and one suburb under its
administration. Key technology project, horizontal
technology transfer and joint production, joint
economic entities and joint marketing to encourage
capital, materials facilities and personnel flow
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between the city and the country-side were allowed.
The administration also helped some counties to
establish two or three key enterprises to ultilise
local resources and to boost local economic
development. This, of course, boosted the
development of rural industries, some of- which were
forced out of business due to inefficiency later.
By 1986, The Guangdong Industrial and Transport
System encouraged horizontal linkages by several
means:
1) to organize and develop fist commodities
between enterprises,
2) to ultilise technoloy in raising productivity
through jointing production and research units,
3) to organize more advanced factory to aid less
advanced units,
4) to develop supply and market according to
production requirements,
5) to ultilise facilities in the interior to
14
produce export goods.
Most joint-economic entities formed were
reported to be relatively simple and they last for
only short peroids of time because of the lack of
supporting legal measures and the lack of
enthusiasm on the part of the participating
enterprises.
According to a rough survey, in 1986, there were
5,405 contracts of economic association
concerning technology development signed involving
an amount of 2 billion 230 million yuan investment
and accounting for 2 billion 742 million increase
in production value or created 414 million profit
and tax to the state. These contracts were signed
mostly with enterprises in the interior concerning
technology development or materials supply. Also
according to survey, the province has established
over 3 thousand compact or semi-compact
associations (especially those producing fist
product and with large enterprise as background)
which were then developing towards conglomerates or
economic combinations.
By the end of 1986, the two attempts at further
reform were still in a process of implementation
with the first attempt characterized by the
emphasis on establishing a contractural
relationship betwween enterprise and their
counterparts having some results while the second
attempt marked by economic decentralization to the
enterprise level proceeding slowly.
In 1983, the Guangdong government combined
adjustment with reform: along-side policies of
technological advancement to increase economic
returns, the duty of the provincial government was
to implement the tax-for-profit scheme as ordered
- by the state, to continue with the Quingyuan
experiment and to try out the various economic
responsibility systems especially those with
16
contracted jobs as the main content.
In 1984, reform was at the top of the
provincial policy agenda and efforts were on
implementing enerprise autonomy as scheduled by the
state, to implement interenterprise co-ordination
to combate territoriality and departmentalism, to
introduce bidding for basic construction contracts
and to continue with the city-centered development
strategy started in 1983 through reforming the
17
administrative structure. Focus was on
invigorating the large and medium—sized enterprises
and the experiments on the seperation of ownership
rights and management rights in small state-owned
18
enterprises in 1985.
By 1986, the more restraining version of urban
reform with its emphasis on contract seem to be the
mainstream of reform. The 'contracting-out'
responsibility system was recommended to all
enterprise in the province while the enterprise
autonmy policy, however, did not seem to have
proceeded accordingly in the same peroid. The
degree of enterprise autonomy may be a guide in
understanding the effectiveness of the seperation
of government and enterprise functions.
In Feburary, 1985, there was the National
Economic Work Conference summoned by the State
Council. At the conference, the chairman of the
State Economic Commission, Lui Tung, disclosed that
according to survey, 15% of large and medium-sized
enterprises were invigorated, 65% were in the
process of being invigorated, and 20% were
fundamentally not invigorated. The problem was
caused by controlling bureaus retaining powers and
they had not transformed themselves into service-
oriented organizations.
In April, 1986, the Guangdong government
summarized seven years of urban reform and in May,
1986 (i.e., fifteen months after the survey
released by Lui Tung), the Guangdong government
proposed an investigation on enterprise autonomy
and the Provincial Increase Enterprise Vitality
Work Investigation Group reported that 20% of the
province's enterprises were invigorated, 55% were
slightly invigorated and 25% not invigoraged at
all. The situation was especially not satisfactory
concerning powers of enterprise to recruit and use
its work force, to determine wages and rewards;
appoint, remove, employ of elect its own personned
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• according to relevant regulations. Furthermore,
i
there were reports of endless wrangling of
enterprises and the inability of enterprise to
create sub-units because of interference from non-
enterprise organizations. By November, 1986, the
Provincial Economic Work Department invited
directors to a discussion and it became clear that
directors were still treated very much as
bureaucrats rather than enterpreneurs and powers
given to enterprises were taken away by intervening
state organizations.
As recent as 1986, the leadership recommended
interenterprise co-ordination or the formation of
conglomerates as a means to overcome territoriality
and departmentalism but enterprises were still
j. t hi i n. a web of bureaucratic controls. In March,
1986, joint-economic entities between enterprise
were upgraded to the creation of regional
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conglomerates.
In April, 1986, Guangzhou Municipality adoptt
a new strategy emphazising four levels and fou_
points:
1) conglomerates between city, locality and
county,
2) conglomerates between the Pearl River delta
region and other regions in the province,
3) conglomerates with neighboring provinces, and
4) conglomerates with the Hong Kong-Macau region
as well as with foreign countries;
also,
1) to invigorate large and medium-sized enterprise,
2) to develop joint key technology projects,
3) to develop a market for Guangdong goods, and
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4) to speed up the development of materials supply.
Afterall, it seems quite clear that horizontal
linkage can be beneficial to ensure the supremancy
of Guangdong industries by ensuring materials
supply and facilitating sales in a only partially
market—regulated economy. As a result, horizontalV
linkages developed rapidly in 1986.
To summarize, by the end of 1986,
'contracting—out' responsibility system and
horizontal linkage were promoted while there were
reports of endless wrangling of enterprise and the
failure to devolve management powers to enterprises
by non-enterprise organizations. Problems of over-
administration has not been alleviated and
the problem of territoriality persisted. We shall
analyze the problem under the topic of the salience
of the administrative method in the next chapter.
6. The Salience of the Administrative Method
In the second part of our study, we reviewed
attempts at reform to alleviate the deficiencies
of the administrative method and to ultilise the
market in industrial management in Guangdong.
For the four years from 1983 to 1986, the
total industrial value of Guangdong increased by
about 38 billion. Industrial output value
increased approximately 41.5% in 1986 when compared
with 1982. The proportion of light industrial
output value in total industrial output increased
to 66.3% in 1984. Annual industrial growth rate
was approximately 18.45% throughout the four years.
The growth rate of light industry output value was
at 12.4% in 1983, 23% in 1984, 25.6% in 1985 and
18.8% in 1986.
Provincial revenue continued to increase from 4
billion 389 million in 1983 to a record high of 8
billion 68 million in 1985,i.e., a 33.8% increase
over that of 1984. 1986 was reported to be another
boom year as far as revenue was concerned. Profit
and tax derived from state-owned industries and
enterprises increased by 12.1% in 1983, 6.9-s in
1984, 27.9% in 1985 to only 0.4% in 1986.
That is to say that problems of increasing
output value, decreasing productivity and heavy
losses continues with no fundamental reform in the
industrial sector introduced by the end of 1986.
According to survey, Guangzhou ranked the sixth
in the state in terms of industrial output value
and its light industry output exceeded Shanghai for
-the first time in the first half of 1986.
Nevertheless, Guangdong's light industry provided
20.29 yuan profit per every 100 yuan output value
while Shanghai's light industry provided 34.17 yuan
profit per every 100 yuan output value. In another
word, Guangdong light industry was not as efficient
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as those in Shanghai.
Production costs increased by 1.3% in 1983, 1.7%
in 1984, 7.3% in 1985 and 6.4% in 1986. Enterprise
losses was 26.8% in 1983, 28% in 1984, and the
trend continues.
Fixed capital investment by state-owned units
increased steadily from 5 billion 950 million in
1983, 8 billion 460 million in 1984, 13 billion 781
million in 1985 to 16 billion 131 million in 1986.
The rate of increase was highest for 1984 and 1985
because of credit expansion and excessive
investment in basic construction but it was
considered under control again in 1986.
The state was still largely ineffective in
c°ntrol1ing investment but a larger amount was now
funnelled into technology rennovation and
development because of the 'contracting-
out'system. Almost 1 billion was spent on
technology rennovation and technology development
in 1983 through bank credits and investment by
enterprises,which added to a total of about 2
billion 110 million. In 1984, the amount increased
to 2 billion 350 million. In 1985, 3 billion 435
million and in 1986, 4 billion 543 million was
spent on technology rennovation and technology
development. The percentage of increase over last
year was 12.2% in 1983, 11.4% in 1984, 46.2% in
1985 and 32.3% in 1986.
Overall, despite the frequent use of
administrative orders, the situation did not
improved accordingly. Stockpiling of industrial
commodities produced by the provcince amount to 5
billion yuan in 1983. For the whole peroid of the
Sixth Five Year Plan, 1981-1985, Guangdong lacked
behind Chiangsu and Zhekiang provinces in terms of
speed and efficiency in economic developments.
Fuel and Transport Sectors remained the weakest
link in the economic construction of the province
and imbalanced growth among localities within the
province worsened during the same peroid. The
shortage of materials and energy, bottlenecks on
transport facilities, redundancy in investment
projects, poor product quality and high product
costs, and many unwise and inefficient investment
projects placed an extra strain on the national
economy and created economic imbalances in terms of
high inflation rate and a deficit.
Structural problems persist into 1987 and was
dealed with by attempts to intensify the
invigoration of enterprises, the increase of
production and savings and to increase economic
returns. Instead of further seperation of
ownership and management rights and the
introduction of the bandruptcy ordinance,
contracting-out system as well as economic
combinations were recommended. It is quite clear
that the administrative method would stay for the
years to come and the enterpises autonomy policy is
in an impasse.
Nevertheless, to present a more balanced view,
innovative measures like the introduction of the
bonus tax, the wages adjustment tax, and, of course
the income tax in enterprises could not be
overlooked and these are clearly devices for the
government to regulate economic activities by
adopting a more indirect role in the future.
Indeed, reform of the economic administrative
structure was included in the policy platform since
1979. Zhao Ziyang in March, 1980 was already
discussing the function of cities in the overall
reform in Szechuan. Albert there were signs that
reform of the economic administrative structure was
halted by the centre by December, 1980 and no
concrete reform was on the state policy agenda,
there had never been the absence of discussion or
enthusiasm among policy bosses like Zhao.
By the end of 1981, the direction of the
reform and an outline was already provided by Zhao.
However, it was not until 1984 that the reform was
once again sgueezed onto the policy agenda of the
state. According to the 1984 Decision, the
invigoration of enterprise, particularly the large
and medium-sized enterprises owned by the state, is
the key to restructuring the urban economy. The
enterprise should be truly made a relatively
independent economic entity through the reform.
The 1984 Decision was a comprehensive though weak-
worded document although it represented the
attempts to second wind.
Since then, attempts to implement the economic
structural reform to date shows that it is not
always possible for policy-makers to rely upon the
conventional means of an administered economy to
forge a market-oriented economy. There had been
flip-flogs and entrenchment in the process and the
success or failure of the price reform-has became
12
the main concern in 1988.
Specifically, in Guangdong, reform of the
economic administrative structure in the 1979-83
era was mainly in the form of financial
decentralization and adjustment was the main
concern in the industry sector until the
introduction of the urban reform. But it was also
true that Guangdong started early in implementing a
great variety of reforms like profit and foreign
exchange investment, capital taxes, greater use of
bonuses and piece rates, and experiments with more
flexible pricing and marketing arrangements but
many changes have been made in all of them.
In the end, Guangdong was neither effective in
1 jivigorating the large and medium—sized enterprises
nor were the enterprises made relatively
independent economic entities. Heavy losses,
stockpiling and low productivity as well as
bureaucratic intervention was still very much on
the scene. Moreover, the reforms appear to have
reduced central control over aggregate,investment.
Meanwhile, distorted relative-prices plus
monopolistic firms caused imperfect closed markets.
Excessive investment persisted and with some hint
of a revision to lending guota led to the
extraordinary credit expansion of 1984-85.
Inflation threatens to upset and slow down even
further the already much watered-down reform
programme. With non-state and local-level
initiatives now greatly mobilised, the economy will
no doubt continue to grow fast but its structural
problems will• persist.
Conglomerates and administrative methods
continue to be recommended because of the need for
authority-coordination when the price system is
still not well developed. True reform vests
important economic powers in basic—level producing
units, and it uses prices and markets to co-
ordinate production. Competition among enterprises
is still not important and would not be necessary
until producers have to bear more responsibility
for their decisions through some meaningful budget
constraint and the possibility of liquidation.
Until then, the seperation of state and enterprise
functions would not be materialized.
The Provincial Party Economic Work Department
summarized the enterprise autonomy scheme as
follow:
the power given to enterprise were often retained
by bureaus and local authorities, layers of
controlling authorities over enterprises was the
main reason why reform has been diluted and
softened; directors7 power has been hampered
because they were treated as members of the state
bureaucracy and were thus answerable to orders from
their superiors.
The paradox being that reform obstacles were
too much administrative interference into
enterprise affairs but the decision to discipline
the bureaucracy may not necessarily lead to the
success of future reform. Guangdong streamlined
the economic bureaucracy in 1983 and 1984 but only
resulted in the establishment of more economic
controlling authorities. Deng Xiaoping and Zhao
Ziyang both admitted by the end of 1986 that
obstacles to reform, though unorganised and not
explicit, were present.
In November, 1986, Deng Xiaoping named three
targets for reform:
1. to maintain the vitality of the state and the
party,
2. to overcome bureaucratism and to increase work
efficiency, and
15
3. to mobilise the rank-and-file and the people.
Meanwhile, Tien Jiyuan was trying to give managing
powers to enterprise while maintaining state
ownership and the status of those employed in large
16
and medium-sized enterprise. That is to say that
administrative method and state-owned enterprises
shall stay. Specifically, Zhao Ziyang pointed out
that the task in 1987 is to eliminate red-ink
enterprises while there was the belief that these
enterprises were capable of transforming and
17
developing themselves.
In Guangdong, concerned authorities
recommended measures to invigorate the enterprises
in 1987 as follow:
1. to lessen the burden of enterprise by decreasing
or eliminating adjustment tax on large and medium-
sized enterprise, shorten the depreciation peroid
for newly acquired fixed capital and measures taken
to stop endless wrangling of enterprise,
2. to enlarge the pilot programme on pegging total
wage to remitted profit and tax and introducing
piece rate, partial and full—fleged floating of
wages while the party and the state should not
interfere with the distribution of wages and
bonuses within enterprises,
3. to ensure the seperation of management and
ownership rights, and the seperation of the state
and the enterprise functions, e.g., small state-
owned enterprises could be leased to collective or
individuals or to be run by them on- a contract
basis while some medium-sized enterprises can be
run on a rental basis and some large and medium-
sized enterprises can go ahead with issuing shares.
Conglomerates or horizontal-linkage was also to be
18
promoted.
To summarize, the reform attempts during the
second part of our study had not solved—structural
problems in the industrial management system and
the enterprise were still in a web of
administrative control. Contractual responsibility
system and horizontal linkage have not provided a
remedy to the situation as to date.
Conclusion
Concerning problems of implementati
formulating policies through the bureaucracy, it
may be quite apt to say that the state continued a
cautiously reformist policy toward a planner
soverignty market system while how far to go in the
direction was left largely to the local authorities
in Guangdong.
The study reviewed the Guangsong government did
not go very far. To summarize:
1) following the principle of decentralization in
management and centralization in controls, the
state delegated administrative and financial powers
to the local government, i.e., the special policy,
flexible measures and eating at seperate
kitchens, reserving the right to practise
centralization measures whenever there was such a
need as determined by the state,
2) The local governemt was given considerable
discretion as regards following the policy
recommendation of the centre,. For example, there
is the evidence that the central policy-makers set
the pace for the expansion of the enterprise
autonomy policy although the Guangdong government
was cautious in starting the profit-retention pilot
programme and did not increase the number of
experimental enterprises beyond the group of 169
enterprise. Local government carried out
selectively the programmes and schemes of financial
decentralization which were authorized by the State
Economic Commission and the Ministry of Finance,
among others and refused to change to the circular
comparison method in 1980. Also, considerable
discretion was given to local authorities in
amending the schemes and formats suggested by the
central authorities as Guangdong initiated the
extra-state-planned profit-retention system and the
industrial administrative structure at the county
2
level. The Guangdong leadership followed the
introduction of the urban reform in the Fifth
Session of the Fifth NPC, November, 1982 and came
up with the contract, association and circulation
three months later. Flexibility in implementation
could be seen as leading to the early development
of the 'contracting-out' system in Guangdong. The
introduction of the comprehensive urban economic
reform in the Second Session of the Sixth NPC, May,
1984, led to the starting of the pilot programmes
in the four cities in June, 1984 and the measures
to decentralize power to enterprises in ten
functional areas. The Guancjdon government was
always in line with central policy by following it
closely, usually within three months' time.
Policies implemented may not always be carried out
with success but local variations on central
policies were rare. Nevertheless, adjustments were
made and distortions developed in the process of
implementation.
3) Local government is increasingly powerful as a
result in influencing the economy under its
jurisdiction and extracts revenues from local
industries, causing territoriality at the expense
of the state and prevented further delegation of
powers to enterprises. The local government did
not openly denounce reform but achieved its purpose
by its neglect in enterprise autonomy and by its
enthusiasm in implementing administrative
directives to influence industrial management and
forming conglomerates. Afterall, there is the need
for much authority coordination when markets were
not developed,
4) the tendency was enhanced by the open-ended
policy process by which policy signals were
transmitted to the local government but until the
next evaluation by the state, what actually happens
was left largely to the devices of the local
government, much implementation power resulted in
distorted and watered-downed reforms.
5) As a result, there was no fundamental change in
the ststem of industrial administration except in
the irn c r e a sed__Jj3J_t±.aXe-s-a s released by the
financial reform and it highlilghted problems of
introducing changes through a bureaucracy for it is
not enthusiastic concerning reform per sec and the
continued need for authority coordination
contributed to the difficulties of socialist
economic reform,
6) failure to implement reform was blamed on
bureaucratism or factionalism by policy bosses and
new cycles of administrative control like
administrative directives and administrative reform
were used to mobilise or to restrict the powerful
bureaucracy at the provincial levels. It shows
thjrtthe—input us to change comes from above and
policy bosses personally overseeing their policies
at the promotion phrase characterized the policy
process. On the whole, it illustrated that it is
not easy for policy-makers to rely upon the
conventional means of an administered economy to
forge a market-centred economy,
7) decision-making powers of provinces were very
limited concerning formulation of policies except
at pilot programmes,when local variation on
national themes run ahead of national political
development. For example, the recommendation of
'leasing, transferring and converting' of small
state-owned enterprises in 1987.
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Enterprise funds system was put into
trial implementation in State-owned
enterprises. The system allowed
enterprises to have a share of up to
5 per cent of the total amount of
wages, should all of the eight
technical and economic indicators of
the annual plan be fulfilled, and 3
per cent if only four major
indicators (quanitiy, quality,
variety and profit) were achieved.
This share of retained profits would
be converted into an enterprise fund
for the improvemnet of•• collective
welfare facilities and for 'socialist
emulation awards' and bonus payments
for the enterprise.
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh
Party Congress was convened,
reaffirming the transformation from
the 'class struggle' to the four
modernizations, and the necessity for
institutional reforms.
The Central Work Conference was
convened and the policy platform of
'Readjustment, reform, rectification,
and improvement' in the development
of the national economy was adopted.
The Second Session of the Fifth NPC
was convened and the policy platform
of Readjustment, reform,
rectification, and improvement' was
to be the guideline in the
development of the national economy
for the next three years.
The State Council promulgated five
policy papers and authorized pilot
schemes of the enterprise autonomy
policy. The five policy papers gave
enterprises modest discretionary
powers in the areas of managerial and
marketing functions, profit
retention, depreciation funds, and







The State Council authorized the
implementation of the 'Special
policy, flexible measures' in
Guangdong province which gave the
province more autonomy and the
authority to initiate measures in
opening up to the outside world to
engage in economic activities.
The State Council convened the
National Conference on the Increase
of Production and Saving in the
Industry and Transport Sector at
Chengtu.
The Provincial Conference on the
Increase of Production and- Saving in
the Industry and Transport Sector of
Guangdong province was convened.
The Second Session of the Fifth PPC
of Guangdong province was convened.
It was decided that the readjustment
of industry, the rectification of the
management system and the Increase of
Production and Saving Movement should
be combined for implementation. The
need to reform the economic
management structure was also
reaffirmed.
The State Council promulgated 'The
Provisional Measure of Profit
Retention in State-owned Industrial
Enterprises'. It applied to the
enterprises involved in the pilot
schemes of the enterprise autonomy
policy, and it effected a change from
the 'total-sum method' of profit
retention to one based upon retention
of the basic profit plus the
incremental profits.
The State Council promulgated 'The
Provisional Regulation concerning the
Financial Management System of the
Classification of Expenditure and
Income and Contracting-out
Responsibility according to
Hierarchy'. It was applied to
fifteen provinces but Guangdong was







had earlier implemented the
contracting—out' according to ratio
and the profit—sharing methods over
Guangdong province by which upon
fulfilling the requirement of
remitting a fixed sum to the central
government or upon retaining a fixed
proportion of the revenue, the
locality was given more jurisdiction
over planning, capital investment,
funds, materials and powers in the
foreign trade area.
The State Economic Commission issued
'The Provisional Measures of Total
Quality Control in Industrial
Enterprise'.
The State Council decided to
establish the 'Office of
Institutional Reform', headed by Tu
Hsing-heng.
The State Council circulated 'The
Provisional Measures concerning Work
on the Digging Up of Potentials, the
Transformation and the Rennovation of
the existing Industry and Transport
Enterprise'.
The State Council adopted 'The
Provisional Regulation of Promoting
Economic Combinations'.
The State Council endorsed 'The
Report on the Work Situation and the
Views for the Future of the Pilot
Schemes of the Expansion of Avtonomy
in Enterprises', allowing enterprises
to adopt a variety of profit-
retention schemes and recommended
decentralization in all aspects of
enterprise management. There was the
emphasis on economic returns.
The Third Session of the Fifth NPC
was convened and a huge national
deficit for 1979 was reported.
The State Council promulgated the
'Provisional Regulation on the
Development and Protection of
Socialist Competition', encouraging
competition between sectors of the






The Central Work Conference was
convened in Beijing and the economic
readjustment policy was reaffirmed.
The Third Session of the Fifth PPC of
Guangdong province was convened.
Readjustment of industry, especially
the 'closure, stoppage, mergers and
transfers' of enterprises was given
priority, while transfers and the
formation of 'association' were
promoted. Rectification in industry
was to be continued according to
relevant regulations promulgated by
the State Council in 1980. The
implementation of the principle of
giving 'Six priority' to readjust the
proportion of light and heavy
industries was to be accompanied by
the policy of switching some heavy
and chemical industries into
producing consumer-oriented
commodities. The Increase Production
and Saving Movement was to be
implemented. The reform of the
economic structure was to be
continued.
The 17th Session of the Standing
Committee of the Fifth National
Peoples' Congress authorized the
Decision to ammend the National
Economic Plan and the Preliminary
National Budget of 1981 by the State
Council so that financial and credit
balances could be achieved in 1981
and prices could be stablized.
Substantial cuts in basic
construction was to be the main
content in the readjustment work of
the year.
The State Council endorsed the
'Summary of Briefing on the Forum on
Institutional Reform in Industrial
Management'recommending a curtailment
of the further expansion of
enterprise autonomy experiments, but
a continuation of industrial





The State Council issued 'The Notice
on the Increase of Production and
Renvenue in the Industry and
Transport Sector to Guarantee the
Completion of the National Economic
Plan of the Year'. Besides the
Economic Responsibility System,
enterprise rectification and
readjustment in the form of
industrial reorganization and
'association' of enterprises was to
be implemented. The principle of the
guidance of the central plan
supplemented by market-co-ordination
was upheld.
The State Economic Commission, the
Office of Institutional Reform, and
other units promulgated 'The
Provisional Measure concerning the
Through Implementation of Papers of
Expansion of Enterprise Autonomy, and
Consolidation and Improvement of the
Task in Expansion of Enterprise
Autonomy'. The Economic Readjustment
policy was reaffirmed. The
strenthening of the unified controls
of macro-economics has to be
accompanied by further invigoration
of the micro-economics and at that
moment, it was concluded that reform
was not implemented except for the
profit-retention schemes.
The State Economic Commission and the
Office of Institutional Reform issued
'The Notice concerning Opinion on
Several Problems of the Industrial-
production, Economic-responsibility
System'. Concerning allocation, the
Economic Responsibility System
involving the relationship between
the State and the enterprise can be
grouped under three types: 1)
profit-retention, 2) 'contracting-
out' of profits and losses and 3)
tax-for-profit, responsibility for
profits and losses. These were
materialized in seven models.
The State Economic Commission
issued 'The Opinion on Strenthening
the Leadership to implement
Rectification Work in enterprises'.






improving economic returns were
considered the most realistic methods
to increase financial income.
The Fourth Session of the Fifth NPC
was convened. The State Council
recommended the continuation of the
policy of readjustment for another
five years. Premier Zhao Ziyang
summarized the development of the
national economy in the last three
years and outlined ten policy
guidelines on economic reform for the
future economic development.
The Finance Department and the State
Economic Commission issued'Several
Regulations on the implementation of
profit-retention and 'contracting-
out' of profits and losses measures
in State-owned Industry and Transport
Enterprises.
Chen Yun reaffirmed, in his talk to
the State Planning Commission, that
the central plan should be given a
principal place and that the market
should play a supplementary role in
the national economy.
The State Council promulgated 'The
Decision to implement Technology
Rennovation with emphasis and step
by step in the existing enterprises'.
The Central Committee,CCP and the
State Council issued 'The Decision on
the implementation of the Total
Rectification of State-owned
Industrial Enterprises'.
The State Economic Commission issued
'The Report on the Work Situation at
the Forum on the National
Rectification of Enterprises'.
The Fourth Session of the Fifth PPC
of Guangdong province was convened.
The implementation of the total
rectification of state-owned
industrial enterprises in the
province was to be combined with the






technology and facilities were to be
imported from abroad. The provincial
government also decided to further
decentralize powers to Guangzhou
municipality and Heinan Island.
The National Work Conference on
Industry and Transport was convened.
Zhao Ziyang delieved a speech on
'Several Problems concerning the
Current Economic Work': that economic
reform should follow the principle of
overall planning combined with
limited freedom, overall
concentration combined with small-
scale decentralization, and the full
play of local initiative- under the
framework of the principle of the
whole country as a chessboard'. The
present problem was not the neglect
of production value but the neglect
of economic returns. The production
of products not demanded by society
led to stockpiling although the
commerce and materials departments
continue to buy them up on the
State's expenditure while factories
reported profits and the locality
gains accordingly because of the
practice of profit-sharing.
The State Council approved pilot
schemes of the comprehensive economic
reform in Changzhou municipality.
The State Council recommended the
establishment of the State
Institutional Reform Commission,
headed by Premier Zhao Ziyang.
The Twelfth Party Congress was
convened.
The State Council issued 'Several
Regulations on solving the Problem of
too much Social Burden on
Enterprises' saying that many units
were currently imposing too much and
too many social obligations on
enterprises and affected the normal
production and economic accounting of
enterprises. The depletion of
profits which should be remitted to





to the request by many localities and
enterprises to demand for effective
measures to deal with the problem.
The State Council promulgated
'Several Problems concerning the
Improvement of the Current Industrial
Economic Responsibility System'.
Under the guidance of State Planning,
the Economic Responsibility System
aims at improving economic returns in
the society and is the implementation
of a production-managerial management
system combining responsibility,
authority and profits. The present
focus should be on the implementation
of inner-enterprise economic
responsibility system:- The
perfection of the Economic
Responsibility System should be
combined with the technology
rennovation of enterprises.
The Fifth Session of the Fifth NPC
was convened. Zhao Ziyang presented
the highlights of the economic
reforms which had taken place in the
last three years of the Sixth Five-
year Plan: the gradual introduction
of the tax-for-profit schemes, the
restructuring of the relationship
between the State and enterprise, the
full development of the role of the
central cities, the alleviation of
the strain between horizontal and
vertical command, the improvement of
commerial channels and commodity
exchange, and so on.
The Fifth Session of the Fifth PPC of
Guangdong province was convened. In
1983, efforts had to be made on
improving economic returns,
rectification of industry and
transport enterprises and to stablize
reform while initiating the
institutional reform.
The Fifth Party Congress of the
Guangdong Province was convened. Ren
Zhongyi proposed the 'contract,
association and circulation' policy




The main contents of the Sixth Five-
year Plan was the implementation of
the economic structure reform,
technology rennovation and solving
problems in eight areas: 1)
streamline the institutions, 2)
implement the various economic
responsibility systems, 3)
decentralize powers to enterprises or
enterprise-type corporations, 4)
maintain varied ownership systems, 5)
eliminate territoriality and
alleviate the strain between
horizontal and vertical channels, 6)
seperate ownership and
management rights, 7) eliminate
equalitarianism, and 8) eliminate
bureaucratism and the style of
'bureaucratic enteprise'.
The State Plannig Commission, the
State Economic Commission, the
Ministry of Labour, and China
People's Construction Bank jointly
promulgated 'The Provisional Measure
of the Constracting-out
Responsibility System in Basic
Construction Projects'.
The State Council promulgated 'The
Provisional Regulations of State-
owned Industrial Enterprises'.
The Ministry of Finance issued 'The
Provisional Measure concerning the
Substitution of Taxation for Profit
Remittance'.
The Ministry of Finance lissued'The
Provisional Regulation concerning the
Income Tax of State-owned
Enterprises' stipulating that State-
owned enterprises should pay an
oncome tax of 55 per cent of realized
profit.
The First Session of the Sixth NPC
was convened. Premier Zhao Ziyang,
in his report on government work
stressed that to prepare for the
Seventh Five—year Plan, three major
items should be on the agenda.()
the reform of the planning apparatus
to strengthen the management of the






development of Socialist markets and
the organization of production and
distribution according to the
requirements of large-scale
socialized production, and (c) the
reform of the financial system, the
labour and wage system, and the
relationships among the centre,
localities, enterprises, and workers.
The State Council and the Discipline
Commission of the Central Committee,
CCP issued 'The Emergency Notice on
the Stoppage of unscrupulous raising
of the Prices of Materials and
Extraction of Fees from Construction
Units'.
The Office of the Central Committee,
CCP and the Office of the State
Council issued 'The Notice on the
Stoppage of Endless Wrangling of
Office Units of Enterprises and
Individuals to accumulate capital'.
The Finance Department and the State
Economic Commission promulgated 'The
Notice of Eliminating Losses in
Industrial Enterprises in 1983',
ordering: extra-state-plan losses
are not to be subsidized by the
State, enterprises not able to
decrease losses according to
indicators proclaimed cannot adopt
the system of 'decrease losses,
losses-sharing' and the appropriate
amount has to be deducted from the
enterprise fund, products requiring
long-term investment for returns and
suffering from losses have to be
'closed, stopped, merged or
transfered' while bonus is to be
cancelled. Guangdong province was
required to cut losses by 40 per cent
or an amount of 83 million yuan.
The State Council issued 'The Notice
on the Dispatchment of Bonus and
Related Problems in State-owned
Enterprise'. Free-floating of bonus
with the upper ceiling removed was





A Forum on the Work of the Urban
Economic Structural Reform Pilot
Schemes was convened at Changzhou.
The State Economic Structural Reform
Commission summarized developments in
the last five years. It also
recommend that the cities practising
the pilot scheme should focus on
invigorating enterprises and
invigorating circulation. The
planning management structure had to
be reformed accordingly.
The State Council issued 'The
Provisional Regulation on further
expanding autonomy in State-owned
industrial enterprise-', giving
enterprise more autonomy in the ten
functional areas.
The Second Session of the Sixth NPC
was convened. Zhao Ziyang declared
the direction and principles of
structure reform and declared the
further opening of the fourteen
cities along the coast.
The Second Session of the Sixth PPC
of Guangdong province was convened.
Reform was to proceed along ten
areas. The focus was on simplifying
and decentralizing powers, the




The Conference on the Experience of
Urban Economic Structural Reform of
Guangdong Province was convened.
Guangzhou, Chanchiang, Foshan and
Chiangmen were to implement the
comprehensive urban economic reform.
The Ministry of Finance issued 'The
Provisional Measure concerning the
Trial Implementation of the Second
Stage of the Tax-for—profit Scheme in
State-owned Enterprises'.
The Office of the State Council
issued 'The Notice on the Stoppage of
the Authorization of the





Rate of Profit-sharing in
'contracting-out7 of profit system in
the future'.
The Provisional Regulation on Bonus
Tax in State-owned Enterprises'.
The Third Plenum of the Twelfth Party
Congress was convened. The Central
Committee, CCP, passed 'The
Resolution concerning Economic
Reform'.
'The Provisional Regulation on
Improving the Planning Structure'.
The expansion of indicative planning
and market-co-ordination was
recommended.
The State Council issued 'The
Provisional Regulation on the
lowering or exemption of Income Tax
and the Unified Industry and
Commercial Tax of Enterprise in the
fourteen cities and the Special
Economic Zones.
'The Regulation on the Implementation
of Classification of Tax Category,
Determination of Income and
Expenditure and Contracting-out
Responsibility according to Hierarchy
in the Financial Management System'.
The National Work Forum on Urban
Economic Structural Reform was
convened at Wuhan. It was decided to
further invigorate enterprises,
especially the large and medium-sized
enterprises. It recommended that
large enterprises could try out
experiments in issuing shares and
small enterprises could be converted
into collective-owned enterprises.
The State was to hand down only a
small portion of compulsory planning.
The Third Session of the Sixth NPC
was convened. Zhao ziyang in a
speech titled 'The Current Economic
Situation and the Economic Structural
Reform' indicated that the Wage





be the main content of the year's
Economic Reform.
The Third Session of the Sixth PPC of
Guangdong province was convened.
Simplification and decentralization
of powers, invigorating circulation
between the cities and the country¬
side and invigorating the enterprises
were to be achieved in 1985.
The Finance Department and the State
Economic Commission issued 'The
Notice on the Determination of the
Ratios for the Five Funds in the
After-tax Profit-retention in State-
owned Enterprises and the
Strengthening of Management'. The
Five Funds were the production
development fund, the new product
development fund, the reserve fund,
the employee welfare fund and the
employee emulation award fund.
The State Economic Commission issued
'The Report on the Progress of the
Correction of the Lowering of Quality
in some Industrial Products'.
'The Provisional Regulation on Wages
Adjustment Tax in State-owned
Enterprise'.
The State Economic Commission and the
State Structural Reform Commission
issued 'The Provisional Regulation on
several problems concerning the
invigoration of large and medium-
sized State-owned industrial
enterprises'.
The Fourth Session of the Sixth PPC
of Guangdong province was convened
and Ye Suanping was elected the
Governor of Guangdong province.
'The Detailed Measure on the
Implementation of the Bonus Tax in
State-owned enterprise'.
'The Detailed Measure on the
Implementation of the Wages





The State Council promulgated 'The
Provisional Regulation on the
Management of Funding for Science and
Technology'.
The State Council convened The First
National Urban Economic Structural
Reform Work Conference. The focal
point of the urban economic
structural reform in 1986 was to
study, develop and promote hoizontal
economic linkages.
The State Council promulgated 'The
Regulation on Several Problems
concerning the Further Promotion of
Horizontal Economic Combinations'.
Since 1978, a multi-level and varied
horizontal economic linkage system in
the production, circulation, and
technology and research areas was
said to have emerged. The objectives
of promoting horizontal economic
combinations were expounded as: 1)
to facilitate the digging up of
potentials of existing enterprises so
that 'less input, more ouput, better
quality products, faster technology
advancement and higher economic
returns'could be attained, 2) to
facilitate the rationalization of the
structure of industrial enterprises,
the structure of the economic sectors
and the geographic distribution of
enterprises, 3) to facilitate the
formation of the commodity, capital
and technology markets, and 4) to
eliminate territoriality and
departmentalism, to realise the
seperation of government and
enterprise functions,
decentralization and the seperation
of ownership and management rights.
Maintaining the principle of mutual
consent between enterprise,
precaution should be taken to prevent
administrative interference into the
formation of economic combinations.
Legal guarantee and tax preference
should be used to encourage economic
combinations.
The Fourth Session of the Sixth NPC
was convened. Zhao Ziyang delieved
'The Report on the Seventh Five-year
Plan'. He outlined the three main
contents concerning Economic
Structural Reform for the Seventh
Five-year Plan peroid: l) to
invigorate the large and medium-sized
enterprise through decreasing the
scope of compulsory planning,
lowering the adjustment tax,
increasing the depreciation rate,
perfecting the various economic
responsibility systems, reforming the
wages and renumeration system, and
the labour system, increasing
enterprise autonomy to enable
enterprise to 'self-accumulate, self-
rennovate and self-develop'. It was
expected that by the end of the
Seventh Five-year Plan, an absolute
majority of enterprises would be
adopting the 'responsibility for
profits and losses' system, backward
enterprise would be 'closed, stopped,
merged or transfered'and horizontal
economic combinations would be
promoted with various forms of
conglomerates and corporations formed
to rationalize the structure of
enterpises and to promote the
development of resources, capital and
productivity. 2) to further develop
the Socialist commodity market and 3)
to enable the government to change to
an indirect role in managing the
economy by ultilising mainly economic
method supplemented by administrative
method in controlling and adjusting
economic activities; compulsory
planning has to be decreased while
indicative planning has to be
increased, economic polices and
economic leverage like taxation,
credit, interest rate, exchange rate,
wages are to be used to control
macro-economics.
The Finance Department issued 'The
Provisional Measure on Several
Problems concerning Taxation Measures
to promote Horizontal Economic
Combinations'.
'The Provisional Measure on the






The First Work Conference on Urban
Economic Structural Reform of
Guangdong Province was convened at
Chunghua. The last seven years of
Economic Structural Reform in
Guangdong province was reviewed. The
Vice-governor, Yang Tehyuan,
summarized development in ten areas.
The emphsis in 1986 was to be
on invigorating enterprises with the
focal point on promoting horizontal
economic combinations. Furthermore,
the Economic Structural Reform
Commission of Guangdong province was
established with Governor Ye as the
Chairman.
'The Regulation on the Responsibility
on Quality of Industrial Products'.
The State Council issued 'The Notice
to stop Endless Wrangling of
Enterprise'. Relevant orders were
also issued in 1982 and 1983 and
action is required to stop the
depletion of state revenue and fees
for technology rennovation in
enterprises by various levels.
The National Work Forum of Pilot
Schemes of Institutional Reform at
Medium Cities was convened at
Chianamen.
The Fifth Session of the Sixth PPC of
Guangdong province was convened.
The Provincial Investigation Group on
the Work on the Invigoration of
Enterprise reported the Situation to
the Povinicial government.
The State Council issued 'The
Decision on Several Problems
concerning the Strengthening of
Management at Industrial Enterprise
'Several Regulations on Controlling
the Scope of Fixed Capital
Investment'.
The Finance Department issued 'The




Finance Officers and the
Establishment of Units at State
Enterprises of the Centre'.
The State Plannig Commission issued
'The Notice on the Organization of
Inspection on the Scope of Fixed
Capital Investment of the Year and
the Clearing of Items under
Construction'.
The State Council issued 'The Notice
on the Commencement of Taxation,
Finance and Price Inspection of
1986'.
'The Provisional Measure of the
Bankruptcy Ordinance in State-owned
Enterprise of the PRC'.


